Judgements of virtue and judgements of obligation are two concepts that have rudimentary differences between them. The idea of obligation, as well as the linked ideas wrongness and guilt, find it necessary to include an agent that is dependent on another person to act or not act in a way that would either be considered wrong or right. This concept is not congruent in any plausible manner to that of the idea of a refined personal character, and an individual may possess a refined personal character without it.

Alas, it’s a paradox since, where the concept itself has obligation included in it from the outset, it would indeed make sense to also incorporate it into our ultimate theory of virtue. It is not an unusual mode of thinking to assume that a virtuous individual will have an inclination towards morally correct behavior. Certain virtues, including those of conscientiousness, justice and regard for the rights of other individuals, can be thought of as purely being reactions to contemplations of moral obligation. This logic will lead us to think that a refined, virtuous person committing an offence not befitting them is highly unlikely, if not impossible, which is a frequent suggestion on behalf of virtue ethicists.

It is crucial that we differentiate two arguments that can be made about this type of definition. The first argument is that for equality: the argument that the range of actions that are morally wrong is equivalent to the range of actions where virtuous individuals would not have an inclination to carry out. The second is the explanatory argument: the argument where it is not characteristic of virtuous individuals to commit such actions provides reasoning as to how morally incorrect acts are identified as just that. The second argument is somehow not logically consistent when thoroughly examined. On the surface, it would seem easier to rationalize the idea that not carrying out a certain action is dependent on the possibility of someone else responding in a certain manner over the idea that it’s the character of the individual that is refined enough to know and be disciplined enough to not carry out that action. This, however, might not be a contradiction to the argument of equality, where if there was truth to it, could be of a crucial nature in terms of the integrity of the theory of virtue.

And on top of this, the argument that the range of actions colloquially considered improper for a virtuous person to carry out being morally wrong in itself also fails to hold water. Imagine that insisting on being tame for the sake of all that is good results in a missed opportunity that could otherwise provided the advancement and benefit of some greater goal, both to oneself and to humanity. In that regard, it would not be advisable for man to give way for fear to conquer him unless he is severely lacking in either the areas of courage or wisdom, or potentially both. By this logic it shouldn’t be an action that a refined, virtuous individual would have in their purview of executing. Similarly by the same logic, it does not mean the moral obligation in order to not commit this act is secured in place, and one should also not feel any guilt as to doing this action, even though they might feel a tad bit embarrassed.

We are able to circumvent this counterexample, and attain an argument of equality that seems more realistic and tangible, if we fall under the assumption that an individual who is refined and virtuous in their nature will not be tempted by feelings of guilt as they arise in response to events that should clearly be defined in the mind of the individual, and that there should be no way that what they do will give rise of feelings of guilt. By this definition a morally wrong action is one that a virtuous person would typically not do as well as feel guilty in case they had done it, knowing as to why it would be considered morally incorrect to do it. There is no need to form a contrarian stance towards this higher quality argument of equality, but that does not mean it would pass every test thrown at it in terms of argumentation. The idea here is that there is no significant decrease in terms of obligation concepts to virtue, as this means the concept of guilt is required for this assertion, and the concept of guilt falls within the category of obligation concepts. Following this same logic, one could argue that the virtuous individual only feels guilty because the act itself is considered morally wrong, and not because it is wrong solely on the basis of the individual’s premonition that they should feel guilty about it.

The terms “right” and “wrong” can be utilized to denote several different things. There are certain instances in which judgements of ethical obligation are not determined by them, as in the case of when one either scores a “wrong” answer or “right” answer on an exam. How straightforward and powerful the word “right” is in implied definition is dependent on it’s contextualization, such as in the example of when someone offers their unwanted advice to another person, opening their statement with “I think this is the right thing you should do in this particular situation”. In this instance it would be safe to say that the most suggested action is often something congruent with the nature of virtue itself, when all things are taken into consideration. It can also be said that an action undertaken in this pretense is not one that would intentionally violate one’s moral duty or obligation. An action can be deemed either cowardly or idiotic and still not instill guilt in the individual who carries it out. The definitions of “right” and “wrong” therefore can strongly be tied to the concept of obligation in ethical theory, where there is insufficient logic to attribute it also as falling under the concept of virtue. This conception of moral obligation as being an obligation to another individual is without a doubt questionable, but there is no need to rise to it’s defense here, as these series of articles are not intended to elaborate on the nature of obligation. The interest ascribed to these series of articles lies in the ethics of virtue, which whatever the case may be, is in itself a field of it’s own, whereby we judge character, and is not meant to serve as a replacement for the idea of the ethics of duty.

It can be said it’s all the same in the sense that virtue shouldn’t be interpreted as an inclination towards correct behavior, nor as an inclination towards an attempt at correct behavior. Historically, there have been interpretations that were suggested that point out the contrary of this, and we can assume the virtuous have an inclination towards attempting to behave in a manner that is generally deemed tasteful and morally correct. We can also be safe with the assumption that they will generally find a way to exhibit correct behavior in almost every situation, with the exclusion being those of the highest levels of complexity and difficulty. But a brief summary meant to define the terminological words “duty” and “right action” falls short of offering an adequate explanation as to the concept of virtue, for two reasons.

The first reason for this is that the concept of virtue tends to cover more expansive ground than you would find in the concepts of action and the inclination to act. Virtue is dependent on emotions befitting that word but also actions themselves. This can still be considered a truthful statement even if emotion does not influence the inclination to act, as in cases where empathy is felt for things that are considered to be worthy of that feeling that have happened some time ago, where it is crucial to note we cannot change the past. Virtue is also dependent on motives and beliefs that influence the nature of the act itself. Arguments regarding virtue and the types of virtue themselves are not meant to serve as ethical categorizations and assessments of various types of actions that can be carried out by any one man, but are instead seen as the heart of what drives ethical actions to take place. This is a great development for the ethics of virtue, as we will see in a later article, empirical evidence shows that virtues that are interpreted as inclinations to right action can not be found as persistently in the lives of those individuals that possess them – and as a result is less realistic to expect them – than virtues that can be defined as having morally correct perspectives and intentions.

Despite it being commonly judged by how it turns out as an action, virtue’s best interpretation is that of the good thing to do as opposed to the right thing to do. This can be regarded as a polemical argument. Even those philosophers who do not see virtue as a concept related to duty, there are those who consider virtue mostly as something that leads an individual to identify and then carry out an action that is perceived as a morally correct response.

John McDowell is one example of a philosopher that perceives virtue as a core mechanism of ethics providing an alternative perspective that would interpret virtue as a “disposition…to behave rightly”, where virtue can be attributed with having a tendency to identify something that needs to be done in response to a situation and in turn attempts to construct an action as well as a method of delivery for that action.

There is a paradox here that is noteworthy. The present state of virtue ethics can be attributed to Anscombe’s analysis of Aristotelian ethics where the idea that the moral compass does have total reliance or obligation to adjust itself accordingly based on the current law in place for a society. It can easily be said that this type of moral obligation has a somewhat tertiary and restricted performance in Aristotelian ethics. Although it could not be said that it was about figuring out the exact correct mode of behavior to a situation. He would instead feel that virtue should be something that guides a person towards the correct emotions and actions, at the time of doing. Aristotle himself states in relations to his thesis that virtue itself is meant to be at the “mean”, and that not being a mathematical sort of mean or midpoint, but rather, along the spectrum of the correct point or degree. This reflection on the Aristetolian perspective of virtue of character tends to be bellowed by a large flock of virtue theorists to this day. Neera Badhwar is correct in her statement that “Aristotle’s conceptualization of the virtue of character should be perceived as an instinctive emotional and rational tendency to feel, choose and act in the correct manner for the correct reasons is agreed upon by many modern philosophers.”

There are several traces in which it can be clearly seen that these series of articles about virtue is not meant to be a reflection of Aristotelian notions of virtue.

It can be perceived with great skepticism to regard the concept of rightness as a requirement for the non-trivial Aristotelian perspectives on the connection between virtue and rightness. The correct manner as well as the goals illustrated in Badwhar’s summarization of Aristotelian virtue would have to be interpreted as conjuring a wider realization in regards to the obligation of individuals to other individuals or social groups. But the classification will be banal or even ferociously circular if the correct way and the correct goals are simply those that fall under virtue.

The most authoritative neo-Aristetolian method of argumentation for these sorts of things involves the detection of the correct goals, and the correct emotions, choices and actions pertaining to them as those that are allowed by practical reason. This is the part where skepticism should be apparent. The conceptualization of practical reason or practical rationality of which the best understanding can be achieved very simply relates this with immaculate quality of thought about these sorts of things. A response by a conceptualization of virtue as it pertains to manners and goals, that can be accepted by immaculate quality of thought should not be disputed as it would constitute a ballyhoo of banality. Due to the skeptical nature of this realization, the intention is not to assume a greater fundamental conceptualization of practical reason in these series of articles, albeit there should not be complete disregard for the claim that this conceptualization cannot be expressed and defended.

It should be believable that Aristotle stressed on providing a correct account obfuscates one of the most alluring approaches in which an ethics of virtue can be separately defined from that of an ethics of duty. Evaluations of virtue consist of a logical pattern that is more congruent of judgements of goodness instead of judgements of rightness. The ideas behind what is considered good and what is considered right can be differentiated from the essence of the characteristic frameworks of assessment they provide us with, wherein the good has greater tolerance for ambivalence and diversity.

If the action can be deemed as one being correct, it cannot be simultaneously deemed to be incorrect, but this action can also be good, in a certain manner, and bad in another manner. Therefore claiming that a certain action is the proper way to proceed is an implication that acting in a manner that is divergent instead would not be correct in some mode of rational inquiry. This can be perceived as being truthful where stating that it is the correct mode of action is not indicative of a judgement of duty or obligation. As Aristotle can be quoted, “there are a plethora of approaches in which one can proceed incorrectly (hamartanein)…yet only one correct approach (katorthoun).” Yet again, to ascertain that some action would be a good action does not necessarily mean there are no viable alternatives that can also be considered morally good. We often also tend to think under the false assumption that if a good action is to be carried out, it will be done in a manner that is in good faith and radiates with virtue. And even in this instance, virtue of different sorts can be used to influence actions that are in vital ways considered good, despite the fact that they might not be the correct thing to do in a particular situation.

If virtue is defined as something that can be perceived as a way of being good as opposed to a way of being right allows it’s interpreter to have a much easier time of figuring out alternatives to the state of being virtuous. This is a crucial paradigm shift given the cultural, religious and ethical diversity with which we must increasingly find ways to cooperate, integrate and comprise in our modern, increasingly globalized world.

CONTOUR

A summarization or contour that highlights some of the more important points in these series of articles will hopefully serve to guide readers to understand the points as intended. Virtue should be identified as a consistent strive for perfection in the state of being good and doing good. In this way we define virtue as a sort of good natured character in an individual, a function that is a part in itself but interconnected to the whole of the individual’s character. It can also be said that certain types of virtues, including courage and benevolence, can be used as an effective force for being for some things and against other things. Following this line of logic, it’s reasonable to ascertain that courage itself is not a product of the being good, together with other certain virtues. These traits can be used to amplify the effect of others, in a positive way to carry out actions that are good, and that stand for good, to be part of a mindset or lifestyle with which one lives.

Over the next series of articles, we will go over concepts such as that of virtue and it’s subsets of virtues, we will attempt to define and identify virtue, we will delve into downturns that every human being is susceptible to and can be tempted by, as well as the quirks associated with a bad moral character. Later on, we will discuss the necessity of being excellent in character, the possible alternatives that can arise out of deliberation for what a good action should be, how they all set out to define virtue and virtues, in terms of their substance, as well as their influence on society and the nurturing of the human condition.

For many modern philosophers, moral goodness is one that can be defined as being altruistic in character, one that consists of an utmost respect and regard for the well being, rights and dignity of other human beings. To compare, this account of virtue is one where it’s perfection lies in the perspective shared by ancient philosophers that taking care of our own selves, respecting oneself and not just others is also virtuous. Later on we will explore the idea of the self in relations to others, and how to maintain a virtuous being whilst balancing the good of others with the good of oneself in the scope of altruism. Afterwards, it will be argued that altruism is one of those good traits of moral character where it’s crucial that one must be altruistic from an intrinsic perspective as opposed to just an extrinsic perspective, if it is to fully qualify as a virtue. There is coherence present in virtuous forms of self love that coincide with some manifestations of interpersonal communication with a perfect pedigree.

Where perfection of moral character is stressed, it is easy for readers to assume that the perspective of the author lies in a superb optimism and faith in humanity, as well as in the moral capacities and intentions of the human population as a whole.

This is not what is intended. There is a strong belief that this divine level of virtue is something unattainable, but one should constantly strive for it, beating all expectations and constantly raising the bar for oneself and others. The problem with it’s visibility is it’s fragmented nature, coming and going in pieces, not completely whole, and therefore, often overlooked, or can only be seen from certain angles. In our most ideal form, we can be virtuous but are sinners simultaneously. Virtue in humans is often a delicate thing, as it is highly reliant on things that are outside of the control of the human, testing it’s boundaries and truthfulness. There are those who will perceive this evaluation of morality in human beings to be feasible, yet ponder at the paradox that it is persistent with the idea that virtue is an inherently good mechanism by nature, and where virtues can be seen as traits functioning at a level of ethical perfection. These perspectives coming together in a rational manner to portray the practical version of virtue is a subject that will be elaborated on later in these series of articles.

In order to reflect on the empirical data collected by social psychologists in order to modernize their philosophical theories, some modern philosophers have begun to state there is truly no existence of virtues and vices, as well as no traits of character. These empirical findings will eventually be elaborated on in a later article within these series of articles. They serve to support the idea that human virtue has reasonable limits, but one can still argue in the defense of the existence of actual human virtues. We will focus on elaborating on the two primary times of limitations that exist as it pertains to human virtue.

The first limitation of human virtue is it’s fragmentary nature. Any one individual will have periods, and depending on the situation, of when they are truly generous over conscientious, and vice versa. Social psychology research has shown that human beings rarely show consistency in terms of adhering to a singular virtue that is exhibited in a wider spectrum of actions. It is rare to see any one individual be consistently honest or helpful across multiple types of situations, and tend to adjust accordingly, partially being influenced by social and cultural norms. We will elaborate more on the evidence for this in a later article. This evidence is helpful to illustrate some things as they pertain to moral psychology, but does not necessarily guarantee the lack of existence of virtues in human beings. We will attempt to detect qualities in human beings that can be seen as both consistent and virtuous at the same time. While these may not entirely fit the definition to be qualified as virtues, they are definitely aspiring traits that could potentially be rationalized as such.

The second limitation of human virtue is the delicate nature of human virtue when tested under pressure through certain dynamics during certain types of social situations, being subverted or contorted into something not recognizable as virtuous behavior, even if deep inside the virtuous character is still prevalent in the individual exhibiting these unbecoming behaviors. The issue that is born out of this reasoning is that whether true virtues would need a certain level of durability to be able to withstand a stress test in order to confirm their much needed authenticity. Another paradox arises out of this in that their reliance on social decorum and context decreases their credibility as an independently measurable trait in order to classify as authentic virtue.

Are these virtues only attributable to individuals or are they attributable to groups? Is moral luck the essence of what makes up a person’s virtuous nature, where their actions and responses are dictated largely in part by events that they have no control over and cannot be controlled in and of themselves, independently from these influences? In a further article down the line, we will construct a defense to the idea that these things should not prohibit certain traits from being labeled as virtues. Virtues should be perceived more as gifts that can be shared with the world as opposed to mechanisms for obtaining rewards from one’s social environment. Later on we will also explore the idea that no human being should be seen as being of a completely virtuous nature, or has all required traits that are considered virtues. One should remember that human virtue is fragmented by nature, and therefore should be judged by the sum of it’s parts. This is somewhat contradictory to the ancient philosophical stances on virtue being a unified concept. It is commonly argued in this doctrine that a person cannot possess only a single virtue without having some residue of the others in his being. We will elaborate more on why this seems realistic in a later article, as well as expand on this even further in yet another article. Later articles will include topics such as the plurality of the virtuous ways of life, integrating them into a person’s moral character, and ultimately the education of virtue.